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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
Anything for love.
I would do anything for love.
I would do anything for love,
But I won’t do that.
1
I won’t do that.

When Meat Loaf mystified scores of listeners in the early nineties
with his logically inconsistent song lyrics, he almost certainly did not
2
look to property law when answering his fans’ most popular question.
This Response does not argue that he should have. However, Meat
Loaf’s (in)famous song lyrics may be able to shed light on what has
become a popular question among property “fans”: namely, what is
the nature of the right to exclude?
In this Response, I argue that an owner’s invocation of the right to
exclude depends upon the owner’s invocation of other rights in the
property bundle. In so arguing, I analyze current efforts to understand the right to exclude through the lens of the “property outlaw,”
whom Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia K. Katyal profile in their
3
recent article, Property Outlaws. I first highlight the effects of Peñalver
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MEAT LOAF, I’d Do Anything for Love (But I Won’t Do That), on BAT OUT OF HELL II:
BACK INTO HELL (Virgin Records 1993).
2
Meat Loaf has said, “What is ‘that?’” is one of the most popular questions he is
asked. See MEAT LOAF: LIVE WITH THE MELBOURNE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA (Warner
Music Vision 2004).
3
Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1095 (2007).
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and Katyal’s argument on the nature of property law’s right to exclude. After summarizing recent efforts to understand the right to
exclude, I describe Peñalver and Katyal’s argument that outlaw behav4
ior has a special and socially productive function in property law, and
explain the connection between their article and the right to exclude.
I conclude this Response by proffering evidence that Meat Loaf may
have audited a first-year property law course, or at least that he incorporated insights about property law into his music.
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE: FAVORITE CHILD, OR ONLY CHILD?
The right to exclude has long been considered the centerpiece of
property law. Since Blackstone defined property as the “sole and despotic dominion . . . over the external things of the world, in total ex5
clusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,” the right
has remained in the minds of property scholars “the sine qua non” of
6
what property is. Despite Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s and A.M.
7
Honoré’s efforts to bundle it with the rights to use, possess, and trans8
fer property, the right to exclude has enjoyed an elevated status in re9
10
lation to its fellow sticks both by the Court and by its commentators.

4

Id. at 1098 (“[T]he apparent stability and order that property law provides owe
much to the destabilizing role of the lawbreaker, who occasionally forces shifts of entitlements and laws.”).
5
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2.
6
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998); see also Richard A. Epstein, Rights and “Rights Talk,” 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106,
1109 (1992) (book review) (“What is wrong with a system of absolute rights that allows
individuals to exclude some persons on a whim and admit others only by mutual consent? By and large, nothing.”).
7
See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
712-13 (1996) (indicating that the “bundle of rights” slogan derives from a combination of Hohfeld’s analysis of rights and from Honoré’s description of incidents of ownership).
8
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th ed. 2006) (indicating that the
bundle of property rights consists of “the right to possess, the right to use, the right to
exclude, [and] the right to transfer”). In addition to these four, Lior Strahilevitz has
argued persuasively that Black’s Law Dictionary, and by extension jurists with an interest
in unpacking property’s bundle, may have erred when omitting a fifth right, “the right
to destroy,” from its definition of “owner.” See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 790-91 (2005).
9
See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (characterizing the right as “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) (acknowledging the right as “one of the most treasured strands” of the bundle);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (calling the right “one of the
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Recent scholarship has focused on disaggregating the elements of
11
the right. These efforts at disaggregation have complemented efforts
to determine whether the right is not only the centerpiece, but the
12
only piece, of property law. Of these latter efforts, perhaps the most
radical has been put forward by Professor Peñalver himself, who has
argued famously that “theorists have generally overemphasized the
degree to which private property enables owners to escape from
13
communal coercion.” Instead, Professor Peñalver favors the conception of property not as exit, but as entrance. He has argued that

most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”).
10
See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights To Exclude,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2006) (noting that the right has been deemed “foremost among the property rights”); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON,
JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION 53 (2006) (arguing that “the
cornerstone of private property is the right to exclude anyone and anything from your
property that you don’t want on your property”).
11
See, for example, Strahilevitz, supra note 10, at 1837, in which the author famously unpacked the right to exclude into four component parts:
(1) The Hermit’s Right (the right to keep everyone off the resource owner’s
property); (2) The Bouncer’s Right (the right to admit prospective entrants
selectively to the resource owner’s property); (3) The Exclusionary Vibe (the
right to convey messages about who is welcome or unwelcome on the property, enforced primarily by social and psychological sanctions); and (4) The
Exclusionary Amenity (the right to embed polarizing and costly club goods on
the resource owner’s property in order to sort between desirable and undesirable entrants).
See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016222 (arguing that the right to
exclude is best understood not so much as a “right,” but as a normative device, analogous to the promise in contract law, in which the right to exclude derives from property law’s norm of resource inviolability).
12
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 6, at 754 (defining property as “the right to exclude
others from valuable resources, no more and no less”). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions 1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 07-38, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014161 (setting forth a theory of property law that accounts for more than the right to exclude, or any other single right, and instead accounts for “(1) the number of owners, (2) the scope of owner’s dominion and (3) asset configuration”); Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
1227, 1231, 1280-96 (2006) (defending the argument that property law should develop
an entitlement scheme to respond to associational collective action problems, such as
the concentration of poverty in metropolitan areas, and that the absence of such a
scheme in current property law derives from a dichotomous understanding of property
law, as either belonging to everyone or no one); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 377 (2003) (understanding the right
to exclude as an “essential but insufficient” element of the meaning of property law).
13
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2005).
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property law is not an institution that excludes, but is instead “an insti14
tution that binds individuals together into normative communities.”
II. THE PRODUCTIVE ROLE OF PROPERTY’S OUTLAW
Professors Peñalver and Katyal view their article as one that builds
upon a dialogic conception of property, which they and others have
15
developed. In Property Outlaws, Professors Peñalver and Katyal argue
that intentional property outlaws—the “little people” and “have-nots”
who “cannot afford to file civil suits or whose voice in the legislative
process is too weak to attract the attention of lawmakers and thus unable to wrest a change in property relations from existing entitlements”—have “repeatedly played a powerful and visible role as cata16
lysts for needed legal change.”
The history that Professors Peñalver and Katyal reconstruct, in
which outlaws have “played a key role in fostering both symbolic and
17
substantive evolution within the law of private ownership,” is persuasive because it is both compelling and intuitive. Professors Peñalver
and Katyal organize their article by identifying three categories of
property outlaws that have helped to make property law “a dynamic
institution that is broadly reflective of evolving community values, as
opposed to a fixed set of entitlements rooted in abstract moral and
18
economic theory.” Those categories are (a) “acquisitive outlaws,” (b)
19
“expressive outlaws,” and (c) “intersectional outlaws.”
Acquisitive outlaws break property laws in order to acquire a piece
of property, typically the piece toward which their lawbreaking is di20
rected. Examples include adverse possessors and those who enter
land under the doctrine of necessity. Expressive outlaws, like the
black students in Greenville, South Carolina, who sat in at segregated

14

Id. at 1972.
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1101 & n.19 (referring to and citing a
“body of literature emphasizing the dialogic and social nature of property law and eschewing the . . . static, individualist conception of property rights”).
16
Id. at 1099-1101.
17
Id. at 1101.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
Id. at 1102 (defining acquisitive lawbreaking as “involv[ing] actions that are oriented primarily toward direct appropriation”).
15
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21

lunch counters in August 1960, did not trespass in order to appropriate the lunch counters in which they sat. In fact, even if the sit-in
participants would have been allowed to eat at the lunch counters
where they were sitting, their goals would not have been met without
the passage of general prohibitions against segregated lunch count22
ers. Intersectional outlaws break property laws for motives that are
both acquisitive and expressive. As Professors Peñalver and Katyal describe, the urban squatters of the 1970s were motivated not only by
their desire to protest the government’s failure to convert publicly
owned, abandoned property into much-needed low-income housing,
but also by their desire to own the dilapidated building in which they
23
had squatted but which they could not afford to purchase.
Each of the acquisitive, expressive, and intersectional outlaws
highlighted by Professors Peñalver and Katyal has engineered social
change. The outlaw’s socially productive role in property law is different from her role in other areas of law. In property law, “outlaws
are able to offer us a concrete vision of their alternative conception of
the law. The property outlaw therefore provides the official decision
maker with actual, rather than hypothetical, circumstances under
24
which to evaluate the degree of her commitment to the status quo.”
Moreover, “American property law is full of doctrines whose principal
purpose appears to be the hindrance of nonconsensual alterations in
25
existing property allocations and entitlements.” In light of the tension between stagnant property law doctrines and the positive social
changes that property outlaws have historically engineered, Peñalver
and Katyal argue that property law “should be careful not to protect
property rights in such a way as to preclude outlaws from productively
26
violating existing official legal norms.” Thus, property law should
27
“retain a certain flexibility” when dealing with property outlaws.
21

See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (holding that convicting black students for failing to leave a restaurant’s whites-only lunch counter violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
22
See Peñalver and Katyal, supra note 3, at 1115 (“[S]it-ins were aimed at achieving
broad legal transformation of the social meaning of public accommodation, one that
would permanently rearrange the property rights of all owners . . . .”).
23
See id. at 1123-26 (explaining that city governments would either auction publicly owned properties to the highest bidder, or else hold them in their dilapidated
states, despite strong local demands for low-income housing).
24
Id. at 1139.
25
Id. at 1134.
26
Id. at 1130; see also id. at 1164 (where the authors express “concern[] that, in its
strategies of punishment, the law may aim to preclude too much property lawbreaking”).
27
Id. at 1141.
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Because of the productive role of property outlaws, Peñalver and
Katyal propose to “legaliz[e] certain categories of forced transfers,
28
temporarily or permanently.” The counter-intuition that lawbreaking can actually promote rulemaking is overwhelmed by Peñalver and
Katyal’s strong case that “creating a formalized process by which [outlaws] can accomplish the goal of ownership[]is ultimately an order29
enhancing, not an order-destroying, strategy.”
Their proposals center on expanding existing tools within property law so that sanctions in certain contexts can be reconfigured in
proportion to the productive value of certain outlaw behavior. For
example, they propose shortening the timeframe during which a tres30
passer can gain title to a tract of land through adverse possession,
and requiring courts to treat economic necessity in the same way they
31
treat necessity caused by natural disaster.
III. PROPERTY OUTLAWS AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
In identifying property outlaws as positive agents of social change,
Peñalver and Katyal explore an important and fascinating phenomenon. Moreover, the authors convincingly reconstruct the history of
our nation’s most infamous property lawbreakers in arguing for the
incorporation of selective outlaw behavior into the stubborn and socially unreflective institution of property law. Their work is illuminating, and its effects on the theory and practice of property law are sure
to be profound and innumerable. This Response highlights in particular how the authors’ ideas impact the nature of the right to exclude in relation to its fellow sticks in the bundle of property rights.
A. The Connection Between Outlaws and the Right To Exclude
Each of Peñalver and Katyal’s outlaws is motivated differently, but
all of them violate, and have violated, property law in socially productive ways. The acquisitive adverse possessor, the expressive sit-in participant, and the intersectional urban squatter have each broken
28

Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
30
See id. at 1171 (arguing that adverse possession requirements, like the customary
seven-year notice requirement, are outdated considering that modern advances have
made property monitoring much easier).
31
See id. at 1173-74 (“In a predominantly market-based economy that relies almost
exclusively upon consensual transactions to get property from one person to another,
economic necessity can be as dire an evil as catastrophic flooding.”).
29
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property laws. More specifically, these outlaws have each invaded an
32
owner’s right to exclude.
For the overwhelming number of sub33
scribers to property law’s axiomatic bundle-of-rights theory, as well as
34
those who favor the “sovereignty thesis,” which elevates in importance the right to exclude above other sticks in the bundle, this shared
characteristic may have profound implications for the fundamental
conception of property law.
B. Anything, but Not “That”: The Problem with Situating the Right To
Exclude in the Bundle
Even the staunchest proponents of property law’s sovereignty thesis concede that the right to exclude does admit exceptions. Cases
where courts have awarded damages or issued injunctions on the basis
of an owner’s right to exclude must be reconciled with equal and opposite reactive cases where courts have not. What becomes difficult
about admitting exceptions to the right to exclude is explaining—
despite those exceptions—the right’s status as property law’s most important or defining right. And, as preeminent property scholars have
noted recently,
As always when one has a basic rule (the right to exclude) subject to exceptions, there is a question whether the exceptions should be stated in
a rule-like fashion, or whether the whole issue (right to exclude or not to
exclude) should be resolved in a case-by-case fashion with more atten35
tion to the balance of interests in each case.

32

As opposed to, for example, invading an owner’s right to use her property by
creating a nuisance. Professor Lee Anne Fennell has observed that property outlaws
who violate an owner’s power to veto a transaction most effectively perform the information-generating function for which property outlaws’ behavior is valuable. See Lee
Anne Fennell, Response, Order with Outlaws?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 269, 273
(2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Fennell.pdf (“There is
something special about an owner’s ability to block a transaction, and hence something noteworthy about lawbreaking that is narrowly focused on removing a blockade.”); id. at 275 (“A focus on blockades also offers a way to distinguish vetochallenging property violations . . . from violations that assert veto powers in areas
where access has been legally mandated . . . .”).
33
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2007) (calling the bundle-of-sticks conception of property a “familiar metaphor”).
34
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
393 (Foundation Press 2007); see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (“[T]he essence of private property is always the right to exclude others.”).
35
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at 439.
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The right to exclude is, of course, riddled with exceptions. In this way
it is no different from many rules. However, much as Meat Loaf’s
statement that he “wo[uld]n’t do that” would not have mystified lis36
teners had he not said earlier that he “would do anything for love,”
the right to exclude’s exceptions may not have caused such a stir in
the property literature had it not been touted in the courts and on the
pages of law journals as property’s number one right.
Property casebooks often cover the right to exclude by discussing
37
two conflicting seminal cases, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. and State
38
v. Shack. In Jacque, defendant Steenberg Homes wanted to deliver a
mobile home via the easiest route, which happened to lie across Harvey and Lois Jacque’s snow-covered field. The Jacques were “an elderly couple . . . [who] were sensitive about allowing others on their
land because they had lost property valued at over $10,000 to other
39
neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980’s.” As a
result of their sensitivity, the Jacques repeatedly refused Steenberg
Homes’s requests to move the home across their farm field. Even offers to pay the Jacques in exchange for the right to move the home
40
across their land were refused. Steenberg Homes’s employees ultimately ignored these refusals, and carried the home using a bobcat
41
through the Jacques’ snow-covered field to their neighbor’s lot.
Though no damages could be calculated as a result of Steenberg
Homes’s intentional trespass, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that “in certain situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the
damage done to the land, which may be minimal, but in the loss of
42
the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property.”
In short, the Jacque court concluded that intentional trespass
causes an inherent harm to landowners, and that by failing to award
punitive damages to the Jacques, the court would “send[] the wrong
message to Steenberg Homes and any others who contemplate tres43
passing on the land of another.” Steenberg Homes’s conduct was, in
44
the eyes of the Jacque court, “egregious” —despite the absence of any

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

MEAT LOAF, supra note 1.
563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
563 N.W.2d at 156-57.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 164.
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actual harm to the Jacques’ land—because intentionally trespassing
on someone else’s land violates “one of the most essential sticks in the
45
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,”
namely the right to exclude.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided State v. Shack very differently. In Shack, the court considered an owner’s right to exclude a
health service provider and a lawyer who wished to enter a camp on
46
the owner’s property where migrant workers lived and worked. In
deciding that “defendants . . . invaded no possessory right of the
farmer-employer” and that “[t]heir conduct was therefore beyond the
47
reach of the trespass statute,” the Shack court held in a larger sense
that
[a] man’s right in his real property of course is not absolute. It was a
maxim of the common law that one should so use his property as not to
injure the rights of others. Although hardly a precise solvent of actual
controversies, the maxim does express the inevitable proposition that
rights are relative and there must be an accommodation when they
meet. Hence it has long been true that necessity, private or public, may
48
justify entry upon the lands of another.

In light of the relativity of property rights, the Shack court weighed the
interests of the migrant workers who lived on the landowner’s farm
against the landowner’s right to exclude individuals who could help
49
them. Because “[p]roperty rights serve human values,” the landowner’s property rights did not “include dominion over the destiny of
persons [he] permit[ted] to come upon the premises. Their well50
being must remain the paramount concern of a system of law.”
What emerges from a comparison of Jacque, Shack, and a number
of other cases that have demonstrated exceptions to the right to ex51
52
clude is that the right to exclude is absolute, except when it is not.

45

Id. at 159-60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)).
46
277 A.2d 369, 370 (N.J. 1971).
47
Id. at 375.
48
Id. at 373 (citations omitted).
49
Id. at 372.
50
Id.
51
See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84, 88 (1980) (holding
that a requirement by the California State Constitution that owners of a shopping mall
permit pamphleteers to petition on shopping center property did not infringe on the
owner’s right to exclude); Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 371-72 (N.J.
1982) (holding that a casino, by opening its doors to the general public, loses its right
to selectively exclude card counters); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 188-89 (Vt. 1908)
(holding that a ship owner could sue the owner of the dock to which the ship owner
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Of course, a rule that admits exceptions is not unusual, whether in
property or another area of law. However, two principal factors make
exceptions to the right to exclude stranger than other exceptions.
First, the hyperbolic characterization of the importance of the right to
53
exclude in cases like Jacque, Kaiser Aetna, and Loretto, where courts
have privileged it over a competing interest, seems not to contemplate
anything but an absolute right.
Second, the right to exclude’s exceptions involve cases in which a
property right (e.g., an owner’s right to exclude) is weighed against a
non-property right (e.g., the right to the preservation of life during a
natural disaster as in Ploof, or the right to free speech as in Prune54
Yard ). One might attribute this phenomenon to the fact that, in
general, non-property rights trump property rights. However, this approach to the right to exclude’s exceptions is problematic for at least
two reasons. First, to say that the law often cares more about protecting people than it does about protecting property is both overly simple and inaccurate. While at one point the purpose of criminal laws
aimed at protecting property rights was to “defend[] society against
[a] breach of the peace, rather than protect[] individual property
55
rights,” that purpose has evolved over time toward the general pro56
tection of property rights. Second, even if it was true that the law, as
a general matter, favored non-property rights over property rights,
what remains unexplained is why the right to exclude, in particular

moored his ship during a storm, and from which the dock owner unmoored the ship,
causing the ship to be driven onto the shore and the people and cargo on it to be
tossed into the water).
52
See Laura S. Underkuffler, Response, Lessons from Outlaws, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 262, 267 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/
Underkuffler.pdf (“The underlying problem that theorists and others face is that
property embodies a deep and inherent paradox. On the one hand, property by its very
nature embodies conscious, brutal, distributive decisions. . . . And yet—and here is the
paradox—protection is also the essence of property.”).
53
See cases cited supra note 9.
54
See supra note 51.
55
See People v. Olivo, 420 N.E.2d 40, 42 (N.Y. 1981) (explaining the historical development of the crime of larceny).
56
See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 51920 (1976) (contending that this evolution was part of a process of “classifying all crimes
as intrusions against specific socially protected interests”); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Response, Property In-Laws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 279, 287 (2007), http://
www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Garnett.pdf (“It may be the case that most
trespasses are relatively minor offenses . . . . But, all the same, . . . most wars are fought
over territory. Property does matter, as centuries of battles, large and small, to defend
it show.”).
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(as opposed to the other property rights in the bundle), is excepted in
this way.
Admitting exceptions to the right to exclude is uncomfortable.
The exaggerated rhetoric of its prominence by Blackstone, and in
cases like Jacque, complicate an understanding of how the right to exclude maintains its dual identity—being at once absolute and nonabsolute.
C. Understanding Exclusion by Way of the Outlaw
Reconciling exclusion’s centrality with its exceptions has led some
to explain that an owner has the right to exclude individuals from her
57
property not as a rule, but instead as a standard. Rules decide matters ex ante, while standards decide matters ex post. Rules have been
argued to be more costly to create but cheaper to apply than stan58
dards.
Shack seems to invoke a standard something like this: If a stranger
crosses the boundary of an owner’s property, then the owner can have
the stranger evicted—provided the owner’s interest in protecting his
autonomy is sufficiently great and the interests of other persons in abro59
gating the owner’s right to exclude are not more important.

Professor Joseph Singer has further developed the contours of
that standard by arguing that “non-owners have a right of access to
60
property based on need or on some other important public policy.”
Singer believes that “owners have no right to exclude non-owners
from their property when access to that property is necessary to pre61
vent serious harm to them or to others.” He argues that property
law’s “reliance interest”—essentially, the idea that property rights
62
serve human values —was at work in Shack, Uston, and PruneYard.
There, the courts “created a public policy exception to the right to

57

See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at 405 (“One important difference between
Shack and decisions such as Jacque is that the court implicitly treats the owner’s right to
exclude not as a rule but as a standard.”).
58
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
608-17 (1992) (comparing the effort and time required to create and apply standards
versus rules).
59
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at 406.
60
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 675
(1988).
61
Id.
62
See id. at 751 (“Property rights allocate power . . . . Those without power are vulnerable. Thus the relation between power and vulnerability should be at the heart of
our analysis of property rights.”).
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63

exclude under [the] trespass doctrine” because, in exceptional cases,
“property rights are shared or shifted to non-owners when [nonowners] have relied on relationships of mutual dependence that made
64
access to such property available in the past.”
While some of those past relationships emanated from agreements between owners and non-owners where owners expressly permitted non-owners access to the owners’ properties, some of them did
not. Of those relationships that did not, like the relationship between
the health services provider, lawyer, and farm-owner in Shack, the operative question is why, despite the centrality of the right to exclude in
some cases, non-owners without express agreements with owners
would rely on access to owners’ land.
Current efforts to understand the right to exclude focus on the
right’s exceptions. Unfortunately, a theory aimed at unifying exceptions to the right to exclude offers little insight into the peculiar nature of the right itself. After analyzing its exceptions, the most that we
know is that some interests are not so important, some are really important, and if a non-owner has an interest of the latter sort, she has
the right to access an owner’s land. We do not know, however, why
some interests weigh more than others when balanced against the
right to exclude, the constant variable.
By shifting focus from the right’s exceptions to the right itself, we
may understand more about both the exceptions and the right. Each
of Peñalver and Katyal’s outlaws presents an opportunity to under65
stand these important aspects of property law. Each outlaw has vio66
lated an owner’s right to exclude. Notably, each outlaw has violated
an owner’s right to exclude when the owner invoked no other right in
the property bundle as justification for her complaint. For example,
67
acquisitive outlaws, like the adverse possessor, “win” against the
owner who does not, within the statutory period, use, possess, or transfer his property. Intersectional outlaws, like the urban squatter, won
access to the dilapidated buildings in which they squatted against the
city-owners who did not use, possess, or transfer them.
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Id. at 676.
Id. at 678.
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See Fennell, supra note 32, at 278 (“The work of refining property law to strike
the right balance between access and exclusion is always ongoing, and Peñalver and
Katyal skillfully show us that outlaws can offer useful, if unconventional, guidance.”).
66
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67
I use the term “win” to refer to property law’s determination that a non-owner
has the right to violate the property rights of an owner.
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The acquisitive outlaw who seeks access to an owner’s property for
purposes of necessity and the expressive outlaw are both slightly more
68
complicated. Each of them wins access to an owner’s property, but
each has violated an owner’s right to exclude while the owner was, in
fact, using, possessing, or transferring his property. However, in each
of these cases the owner’s exclusion was not related to its use, possession, or transfer of his property. Of course, the owners in each of
these cases could have argued that their need to exclude, for example,
black students from sitting at their lunch counters or ship owners
from mooring ships to their docks, infringed on their use, possession,
or ability to transfer their property. Under the current conception of
the right to exclude, whose violation in Jacque caused inherent harm,
69
owners would not need to so argue.
Thus, through property law’s outlaw, the right to exclude is understood as the right that protects owner from non-owner. However,
the outlaw tells us that an owner cannot invoke such an important
right if he wishes to invoke it in isolation. The message is an important one—exclusion is central to property, but property is also central
to exclusion. The right to exclude is ultimately the most important of
the sticks in the property bundle. However, to invoke such an important right, an owner must demonstrate his commitment to property by
excluding while, or for the purpose of, using the bundle’s other sticks.
CONCLUSION
The right to exclude is not only one of the most important rights
in the property bundle; it is the most puzzling. Its mysterious dual
identity has generated a need within the legal community for explanations. This Response has sought to provide an explanation of the
right to exclude that embraces its duality. I have argued that the right
is absolute, so long as its exercise is coupled with the exercise of another right in the property bundle.
The theory’s honesty—its respect for the right’s simultaneous absoluteness as well as its exceptions—promotes a clearer understanding
of the right to exclude, as well as its neighboring sticks. Property outlaws demonstrate that the right to exclude allows an owner to do anything to protect her property, even though it does not allow her to . . .
do that.
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See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
Of course, in the case of the lunch counter owner, a plea to exclude blacks
would be denied today even if backed by a property-related reason.
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